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FROM ILLUSION TO REALITY-
RELIEF IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
Frank E. Schwelb*
I. Introduction
For more than two centuries the black man in America was regarded, by
lawyers and laymen alike, as a being of an inferior order, with no rights whatso-
ever which a white man was bound to respect.' After a bloody civil war, fought
in part to end his servitude, the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
made the Negro, in theory at least, the white man's equal before the law. Reality,
however, was different. For almost a century after the Civil War, slavery was
replaced by its stepchild, segregation, as a way of life for many black Americans,
and few encountered in their daily lives the equality of opportunity which the
liberating amendments were designed to assure.
There was a short period after the Civil War when it appeared that black
men might in fact enjoy their rights. When the old Confederate States contrived,
by so-called Black Codes and other devices, to deny the Negro the basic rights
of citizenship,2 Congress responded with the program known as Radical Recon-
struction. The South was placed under military occupation. Many whites in
the rebellious states were disfranchised and their governments were placed in the
hands of carpetbaggers, scalawags, and local blacks. During this period, and
even for some years thereafter, blacks obtained the right to vote and achieved
some desegregation of public accommodations in many areas of the South.'
In 1876, however, Republican Rutherford Hayes won the presidential elec-
tion by securing white southern support in exchange for a policy of ending
military occupation of the South. Gradually, the entire region was returned to
the rule of local whites. By the turn of the century, all of the former Confederate
States had adopted new constitutions which effectively disfranchised the Negro
and accomplished white political and social supremacy.' In the Deep South,
these constitutions remained in effect, in spirit as well as in letter, for three
quarters of a century.
* The author is the Chief of the Housing Section, Civil Rights Division, Department of
justice. Any opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not represent those of
the Department of Justice.
1 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
2 Under the Black Codes, blacks were barred from owning property or voting. Accord-
ing to one historian:
[The] Black Codes gave the Negro population very little freedom. The colored
man was free in name only in many cases. The apprentice, vagrancy, and other pro-
visions of these statutes forced the Negro into situations where he would be under the
uncontrolled supervision of his former master or other white men who were willing to
exploit his labor.
MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 27 (1940); see Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968).
3 VAN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 16 et seq. (1955).
4 For some decisions discussing these Constitutions, see Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 543 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1965); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-11 (1966); United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 131-32
(1965); Gaston County v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 678, 684 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd, 395
U.S. 285 (1969).
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The black man's political impotence was accompanied by discrimination
and degradation in practically every aspect of life. Mississippi was a striking
example. Segregation was required by law in its schools,5 hospitals, prisons,
insane asylums, parks, waiting rooms, places of amusement, and other facilities.
It was unlawful for an operator of a small motor vehicle for hire to carry Negro
and white passengers at the same time, unless the Negro was a servant; for a
white pupil to go to a school also attended by Negroes; and for a traveller to
enter a waiting room or restroom designated for another race. While "colored"
nurses were required to attend "colored" patients at all state hospitals, it was also
mandatory that they work under the direction of white supervisors.6
The Mississippi legislature reacted with fury to the landmark decision of
Brown v. Board of EducationJ It became the sworn duty of every elected and
appointed official of state, county, or local government to oppose or resist the im-
plementation of what the state legislature called the "unconstitutional" deseg-
regation decrees of the Court and of other federal agencies.8 The legislature also
made it a crime to advocate social equality between the races or intermarriage
between whites and blacks.'
In 1962, it required the intervention of the U. S. Army to register James
Meredith, the first black student at the University of Mississippi. The Governor
and Lieutenant Governor of the State were later held in civil contempt of court
for their attempts to frustrate the judicial process." The taxes of citizens, black
and white, financed state aid to the segregationist Citizen's Council." The entire
governmental structure of Mississippi was arrayed against fulfillment of the con-
stitutional rights of Negroes.
II. The Civil War Amendments: Years of Failure
How could such deplorable conditions continue to exist almost a century
after the Civil War? First, the Supreme Court, closely attuned to the political
climate of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, had so construed the post-
5 The dissenting opinion of Judge John R. Brown in United States v. State of Missisilppi,
229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd, 380 U.S. 128 (1965), discussed in some detail the
historic disparities between black and white schools. The substantial differences over the years
in the instructional cost per child in Mississippi schools for black and white children are illus-
trated by the following statistics:
1900-01 1929-30 1939-40 1949-50 1956-57 1960-61
White $ 8.20 40.42 31.23 78.70 128.50 173.42
Negro $ 2.67 7.45 6.69 28.83 78.70 117.10
United States v. State of Mississippi, 229 F. Supp. 925, 990 n. 63 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
6 The Government's brief in United States v. State of Mississippi, C. A. No. 3791 J (S.D.
Miss. 1965) a case challenging the legality of the Mississippi poll tax as a prerequisite for voting,
contains a compendium of the state's segregation requirements. See also Meredith v. Fair, 298
F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1962).
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 Law of 1956, ch. 254, §§ 1, 2 [1956] Miss. Laws 41 '(repealed 1970).
9 Miss. CODE ANN. § 2339 (1956).
10 For the history of this protracted litigation see United States v. Barnett, 330 F.2d 369
(5th Oir. 1963), certified question answered in the negative, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). Also, see
the appellate court's extraordinary unilateral dismissal of criminal contempt charges against the
Governor and Lieutenant Governor on the grounds that times had changed so much since
their alleged acts of defiance. United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).
11 See LORD, THE PAST THAT WouLD NOT DIE 78 (1965); SILVzR, Mississippi, THE
CLOSED SOCIETY 8 (1963).
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war amendments as to give the least possible offense to the white South. The
fourteenth amendment appeared to guarantee equality of treatment under the
law, but in Plessy v. Ferguson' the Court ruled that separate railroad cars for
Negroes and, by implication, separate schools for the two races, did not violate
that amendment provided that they were substantially equal. Moreover, although
both the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments contained clauses authorizing
Congress to enforce their provisions by "appropriate legislation," the Court had
held that Congress had no power to prohibit racial discrimination by privately
owned inns, hotels, restaurants, and other establishments which purportedly served
the general public, but which actually refused service to blacks.'3 The Supreme
Court's treatment of the fifteenth amendment also failed to make the Negro's
right to vote a reality.'4
Restrictive interpretations by the courts were but one impediment to the
enjoyment by Negroes of the rights secured to them by the post-Civil War amend-
ments. Even accepting the narrowest interpretation possible of the fourteenth
amendment, the separate schools for Negroes were at least required to be equal.
In fact, they were manifestly inferior.' Furthermore, while the discriminatory
practices of election officials were often flagrant," there was, as a practical matter,
very little that could be done about it. Not many victims of discrimination had
realistic access to the courts, and the few who did were seriously inhibited from
taking advantage of their rights because the threat of reprisal was very real.
Mississippi is the southern state with the largest percentage of blacks, and,
possibly for that reason, it was always in the forefront of resistance to proposals for
progress in civil rights. In the early 1960's, when major civil rights litigation first
came to Mississippi, there were only three black men in the state engaged in the
active practice of law, and one of those was held to have been subjected to
harassment not only by county authorities but also by a federal district judge.'7
White lawyers did not, and, as a practical matter, could not, take on civil rights
cases. One who tried to do so had to leave the state." Most Negroes who were
denied the right to vote could not obtain a lawyer. Moreover, in the few cases
in which a Negro did get legal representation, the resources at the lawyer's dis-
posal were generally insufficient to defray the costs of a lawsuit in which volu-
12 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896).
13 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14 See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
In Giles, no less a figure than Mr. Justice Holmes held for the majority that a federal court
was without jurisdiction to require Alabama registrars to register a Negro alleged to have been
a victim of pervasive discrimination against his race, largely because "equity cannot undertake
... to enforce political rights." Id. at 487. 'With this approach in vogue, the courts did not
become an effective avenue by which disfranchised Negroes could secure the right to vote.
15 See note 5, supra; Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285, 289-90 (1969).
16 For some of the more remarkable discriminatory practices by registrars of voters, see
United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. State of Mississippi,
339 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Holmes County, Miss., 385 F.2d 145 (5th Cir.
1967); United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380
U.S. 145 (1965).
17 In re Brown, 346 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1965).
18 See SILVER, supra note 11, at 96-98 for an account of the forced departure from Mis-
sissippi of William Higgs, a white classmate of the author at Harvard Law School. For a
description of the difficulties encountered by lawyers who took on civil rights cases, see Sobol
v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D.La. 1968) '(three judge court).
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minous records had to be photocopied and studied to prove the requisite pattern
of discrimination.19 In Forrest County, Mississippi, the federal courts ultimately
found intractable discrimination in voting,0 but a suit by black plaintiffs which
went all the way to the Supreme Court failed to correct the situation.2
Some states took resourceful advantage of the restrictions which poverty
imposed on Negroes who attempted to enforce their civil rights. In the 1950's,
Mississippi enacted legislation to inhibit suits against discrimination in voting
by requiring an applicant who claimed that he had been wrongfully denied regis-
tration to exhaust burdensome administrative remedies before seeking judicial
relief. The statute, which provided for a hearing, the subpoena of witnesses,
and a stenographic transcript, also required that the losing party pay the cost of
the entire proceeding.22 The stenographic costs alone might easily have equaled
a black tenant farmer's annual income.2"
Another effective barrier to the exercise by Negroes of their constitutional
rights was the fear of reprisal. During the 1950's, several blacks were murdered
practically on the courthouse steps while apparently attempting to obtain the
right to vote 4 Three civil rights workers, who were in the South to encourage
blacks to register, were lynched a few days prior to the enactment of the U. S.
Civil Rights Act of 1964.25 Reported judicial decisions describe how the registrar
of Walthall County, where no blacks were registered, pistol-whipped a civil
rights worker who had brought two elderly Negroes to register, and then had the
victim arrested for breach of the peace;26 how the Sheriff of Rankin County and
his deputies brutalized young blacks while they were attempting to register;- 7 how
a black schoolteacher was dismissed from her teaching position in Greene County
immediately after school authorities learned that she had complained about voting
discrimination in neighboring George County;2  and how a Negro, who had led
registration efforts in Holmes County, was charged with the crime of fire bombing
19 For some of the cases in which black plaintiffs tried vainly to resort to the federal courts
to secure their right to vote without discrimination, see Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903);
Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951); Darby v. Daniel,
168 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Miss. 1958) (three judge court).
20 See United States v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1965); Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d
222 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963). See also CHAZE, TIGER IN THE
HONEYSUCKLE (1965).
21 Peay v. Cox, 190 F.2d 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 896 (1951).
22 Miss. Code § 3224 et seq. (1942). The name of every applicant for registration also
had to be published in the local newspaper-a very frightening requirement for rural blacks.
23 According to expert testimony in United States v. State of Mississippi, C.A. No. 3791
(j.) (S.D. Miss. 1965) 63% of the black families in Mississippi in 1965 earned less than $2,000
per year. Court costs in many cases run far above that figure.
24 See CooK, THE SEGREGATIONISTS 54-55 (1962); LORD, supra note 11, at 67.
25 See Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946
(1970), for the story of the murders. See also WHrrEHEAD, ATTACK ON TERROR; THE FBI
AGAINST THE Ku KLux KLAN IN MIssissnPI (1970); Hum, THREE Lmvas FOR MIssIssIPI
(1965).
26 United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).
27 United States v. Edwards, 333 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1964). By the time this case was on
appeal, the sheriff was out of office, and for that and other reasons no injunction was issued.
28 United States v. Board of Education of Greene County, Miss., 332 F.2d 40 (5th Cir.
1964). The Court did not, however, draw the necessary inference that the teacher's voting
activity was the cause of her dismissal, so no relief was secured for her. Compare Greene
County with Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
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his own home by a sheriff who had previously proclaimed that no black would
vote in the county during his tenure in office. 9
In addition to the Meredith case, a Negro who tried to register at an all-
white university in Mississippi was sentenced to seven years in the penitentiary
after having been found guilty by an all-white jury of being an accessory to the
theft of a chicken, while the "principal" to the crime, who had testified against
the defendant, went free."0 Another black who had attempted to attend a segre-
gated university was promptly packed off to an insane asylum.31
Since most serious white crimes against Negroes went unpunished,' a black
did not have to be especially timid to forego the assertion of his rights. Discre-
tion was not only the better part of valor, but practically a necessity of life.
III. The Creation of Corrective Machinery
Black veterans who had served in the armed forces during World War II
and in Korea were understandably bitter when the democracy for which they had
risked their lives in foreign lands was still not available to them at home. Pressure
for equal rights from both Negroes and sympathetic whites increased. It had
become obvious that "separate but equal" was a myth. It was thus a reflection
of the change that had come to the world, as well as to the Nation, when the
Supreme Court held in the landmark Brown decision 3 that state-enforced racial
segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. Brown was followed by a
series of decisions which invalidated compulsory segregation in virtually every
aspect of American life.3"
For many decades, civil rights legislation had been talked to death through
filibusters by southern senators. In 1957, however, Congress enacted the first civil
rights act since the Reconstruction period. While civil rights advocates had
favored a more comprehensive act which would deal not only with voting rights
but also with school desegregation and discrimination in employment, the final
version dealt primarily with the right to vote. The statute was designed to cir-
cumvent the obstacles which had previously hampered Negro efforts-intimida-
tion and lack of access to adequate representation-by putting the Justice De-
partment in the enforcement business. This introduced federal resources into
what had previously been a private quarrel between Negroes and southern local
officials.
29 United States v. Holmes County, Miss., 385 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1967).
30 LoRD, supra note 11, at 76.
31 Id.
32 In 1958, a young Negro named Mack Charles Parker, was charged with the rape
of a white woman in Poplarville, Mississippi. He was taken from the courthouse by a gang
of whites and lynched. The FBI investigated and reportedly identified the killers, but the all-
wlhite local jury declined even to look at their report. No one was indicted.
33 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34 See, e.g., Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 '(1963) (public parks); Browder v. Gayle,
142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (transportation);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (laws prohibiting intermarriage between whites and non-
whites held unconstitutional).
Ultimately, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits
racial discrimination by private entrepreneurs in contractual relations and transactions affect-
ing property constituted a badge of slavery, notwithstanding past assumptions to the contrary.
,ones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
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The Civil Rights Act of 1957 authorized the Attorney General to initiate
suit in a federal district court for an injunction and other relief against discrimi-
nation or intimidation in the electoral process." The need to secure state "ad-
ministrative remedies" was eliminated in such federal suits. Registrars who
engaged in discriminatory practices would now have to cope with whatever
resources the Nation chose to invest in this activity, rather than with the there-
tofore futile efforts of the impoverished Negro. Moreover, the federal government
could not be run out of town or lynched by those intent on perpetuating a dis-
criminatory status quo.
Some states resisted. Traditionally, when someone claimed the denial of his
rights, it was up to him and not the Government to seek redress in the courts.
Previously, the Attorney General had only been authorized to prosecute the
offending official for wilful deprivation of constitutional rights. Even if this had
resulted in a registrar's conviction,"8 the prosecution could not enfranchise the
Negro. It was contended on behalf of a Georgia registrar in the landmark Raines
case that the new Act was unconstitutional because, among other things, the
United States was not the "real party in interest." The dispute, it was contended,
was between the black man alleging discrimination and the state official alleged
to be denying him his rights, and the victim should have to fight his own battle.
It would be unfair, so it was argued, to put the resources of the federal govern-
ment on the side of a private litigant. The Supreme Court rejected this claim,
holding that the United States had a clear interest, distinct from that of individual
Negro applicants, in preventing the widespread denial of voting rights to its
citizens. This interest was sufficient, the Court found, to empower Congress to
give the Attorney General standing to sue?8
The provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 which authorized civil suits
by the Attorney General was copied in the civil rights legislation of the next
eleven years. In 1964 Congress prohibited racial segregation and discrimination
in employment, 9 in hotels, restaurants, theaters and other places of public ac-
commodation,4" and in public facilities, such as courthouses, prisons, and public
parks.4 It also strengthened the Supreme Court's school desegregation ruling
by providing that recipients of federal financial assistance had to desegregate to
remain eligible for federal money.42 Later in 1968, Congress refined the coverage
of the civil rights laws by prohibiting discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, and national origin in most privately owned housing." Each of these
new laws contained a provision which authorized the Attorney General to initiate
35 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c).
36 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, and 594. There is no record of a criminal conviction in
recent times of any election official for discriminating against Negroes.
37 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
38 For cases on the Attorney General's standing to sue without explicit congressional
authority, see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895); United States v. City of Jackson, Miss., 318
F.2d (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Brand Jewellers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1970); United States v. Madison County Board of Education, 326 F.2d 237 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 929 (1964); United States v. Brittain, 319 F. Supp. 1058 (N.D. Ala. 1970).
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This law also prohibits discrimination based on sex.
40 Id. § 2000a et seq.
41 Id. § 2000b et seq.
42 Id. § 2000d et seq.
43 Id. § 3601 et seq.
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civil suits to restrain violations, at least in those cases where the discrimination
was alleged to have been pursuant to a "pattern or practice." A decade after the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957, Congress had not only extended the
scope of these laws from state action to discriminatory private conduct," but had
also counterbalanced the individual victim's lack of resources to assert his rights
by providing him with a powerful friend in court.
To enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and subsequent civil rights legisla-
tion, Congress created a Civil Rights Division in the U.S. Department of Justice.
As new civil rights laws have been enacted, this Division has been entrusted with
much of the enforcement responsibility. Because of the Division's limited staff,"
it has had to select priorities so that its manpower may be devoted to those cases
which will do the most good. In particular, the Division's responsibility has been
to give life to the laws which it enforces by securing effective and comprehensive
relief. The basic remedy available to the government for civil rights violations is
the injunction, and the civil rights laws have left the form and scope of the
appropriate decree to the courts. If, after a time-consuming lawsuit, the govern-
ment could secure no more relief than a court order prohibiting discrimination in
the future, it might be questionable whether the result was worth the effort;
discrimination was already unlawful when the suit began.4" Since the Division has
the responsibility for maldng civil rights legislation a vehicle for justice, it has had
to devise more effective remedies.
IV. Devising a Remedy
A. The Right to Vote
The right to vote was at issue when the Department of Justice entered the
battle for equal rights, the subject matter of the Civil Rights Division's early cases.
The typical scenario of a lawsuit of this type was a rural county in Mississippi,
Alabama, or Louisiana. In the Mississippi cases, in several of which the author
was counsel for the government,47 substantially all whites, but very few, if any,
Negroes, were registered to vote." In order to register, an applicant had to fill
44 Since the Supreme Court had held congressional enactments against private discrimina-
tion unconstitutional after the Civil War in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), its
treatment of the new enactments is interesting. The power of Congress to prohibit discrimina-
tion in places of public accommodation was sustained under its power to regulate commerce
between the states, Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. Mc-
Clung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), so the holding of the Civil Rights Cases was not disturbed. The
constitutionality of the fair housing laws was sustained pursuant to the power of Congress
under the thirteenth amendment to eliminate "badges of slavery." Jones v. Mayer Co., 392
U.S. 409 (1968).
45 In 1957, the entire Division was less than twenty lawyers strong; today there are about
150. The Division's annual budget to enforce all of the civil rights laws nationwide has steadily
grown, but it still amounts to less than a third of the cost of a single warplane.
46 A simple injunction can, of course, be enforced by contempt. See, e.g., United States
v. Lynd, 349 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1965); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 '(1964).
47 The author has served with the Civil ?Rights Division since 1962.
48 See generally United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965), rev'g 229 F. Supp.
925 (S.D. Miss. 1964). The Government's answer to interrogatories in this decision, sum-
marized in Judge Brown's dissenting district court opinion, contains the most complete compila-
tion of discriminatory statistics and incidents.
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out a complicated application form and write a "reasonable interpretation," to
the registrar's satisfaction, of any section of the Mississippi Constitution. The
section could have been about eminent domain or ex post facto laws (for blacks it
often was), or any easy one such as section 30: "There shall be no imprisonment
for debt, which, predictably, was most often assigned to whites."
The registrar was seldom satisfied with an interpretation written by a black
applicant. On the other hand, the answers given by whites were frequently
identical, and the proof in many cases showed that the registrar simply allowed
white applicants to copy someone else's completed form. Often, the copying was
not very artistic. Twelve Lauderdale County, Mississippi, whites wrote that "no
one can be placed in prison for death," as their interpretation of "there shall be no
imprisonment for debt." A George County white man wrote: "I thank that a
Neorger should have 2 years in college be fore voting be cause he dont onder
stand" as his interpretation of the same provision. They were all registered
despite their obvious lack of comprehension."
To uproot such a deeply ingrained pattern of life by means of a civil rights
suit is difficult. Although the cases were tried in a federal court, even that
forum was not always favorable."0 A few of the federal judges assigned to hear
these cases appeared to be reluctant to grant relief, sometimes finding no "pattern
or practice" of discrimination even though the facts were quite persuasive.
When these judges did find that discrimination had occurred, they would often
grant only a very limited remedy, usually in the form of an injunction prohibiting
discrimination in the future." While such a remedy might appear fair and ade-
quate in the abstract, it was likely to be ineffective as a practical matter because
the consequences of past discrimination would be left intact. Even if such an in-
junction was obeyed, it would only assure that the few unregistered whites, as well
as the many unregistered blacks, would now have to pass a difficult test in order
to register. This relief did nothing about the racial imbalance on the voting rolls,
where whites overwhelmingly outnumbered Negroes because of prior discrimina-
tion. Most black citizens would still have to take the constitutional interpretation
test, which had been effectively waived for the whites, and the effects of past
discrimination were therefore perpetuated or "frozen" by such an order. For
the Negro, the right to vote, either as an end in itself or as a means for securing
other rights, remained only a remote dream.
Very few blacks applied for registration, and only a minuscule fraction of
those succeeded in registering. The results in Mississippi of the initial enforce-
ment of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 are reflected in the following table:"
49 See the Government's exhibits and brief in United States v. Coleman, 9 Race Rel. L.
Rep. 1354 (S.D. Miss. 1964) and in United States v. Ward, 345 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1965).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759, 766 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1964) (acerbic re-
marks about "our colored gentry" by a federal district judge are recorded for posterity) ; United
States v. Ramsey, 353 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1965). For an interesting discussion of the recal-
citrance of some United States district judges, see LusKY, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE
FEDERAL LAW: A PROBLEM IN NULLIFICATION, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963).
51 Even the generally progressive United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
originally approved such limited relief. United States v. Atkins, 323 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1963).
52 MARSHALL, FEDERALISM AND CIVIL RIGHTS 25-27 (1964). See adso South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 313-15 (1966).
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Date Suit Percentage Percentage of
Was Filed of Negroes Negroes Registered
Registered on on 12/1/63
City or County Filing Date
Clark Co. 7/6/61 0.00 1.50
Forrest Co. 7/6/61 0.20 1.20
Jefferson Davis Co. 8/3/61 2.00 3.60
Walthall Co. 8/5/61 0.00 0.12
Panola Co. 10/26/61 0.01 0.36
Tallahatchie Co. 11/17/61 0.01 0.08
George Co. 4/13/62 1.20 2.00
Jackson 8/28/62 4.30 4.50
Sunflower Co. 1/26/63 0.84 about same
Himds Co. 7/13/63 13.00 about same
In spite of this discouraging rate of progress, the Civil Rights Division
pressed forward, bringing lawsuits in the most recalcitrant counties of the Deep
South. Typically, one, two, six, or ten Negroes might be registered in areas
where none had voted in seventy years, but the remaining thousands remained
disfranchised. In all of the cases, the Government asked-at frst in vain-for
comprehensive relief which would eliminate the effects of decades of unlawful
discrimination and give the Negro a meaningful opportunity to vote.
In the spring of 1964, a breakthrough came. The improbable locale for
this turning point in constitutional history was rural Panola County, Mis-
sissippi, where 70% of the whites, including dozens of illiterates, voted freely,
but where only two black citizens had succeeded in registering during the
preceding 75 years. In a suit against Panola's registrar,5" the Government
introduced evidence which showed that blacks had been given far more difficult
registration tests than white applicants, that the registrar had assisted whites,
but not blacks, with their applications, and that even those whites who could
not read or write were allowed to register without difficulty. The trial judge,
however, denied the Government relief on the ground that the Negro applicants
had not correctly interpreted the abstruse sections of the Mississippi Constitution
which had been assigned to them, notwithstanding that white applicants had
never been required to interpret comparable sections.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unhesitatingly reversed the dis-
trict court's decision. The most difficult question for the court concerned the
form which the remedy should take. The Mississippi Attorney General, represent-
ing the registrar, argued that if any relief at all was appropriate, it would be
simply an injunction prohibiting discrimination in the future and striking from
the voting records all white voters who had been chosen to testify and who had
thus been shown to be illiterate. However, in an eloquent opinion by Chief
Judge Tuttle, the appellate court explained why such relief would be inadequate:
[Mhere is no possible way to know how many thousands of white citizens
53 United States v. Duke, 332 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1964).
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of Panola County were registered by "just signing the book." Many of
them may well be thoroughly qualified even under the most stringent re-
quirements as they appear in today's statute. On the other hand, relatively
few of them will ever have to face this hurdle. As it now stands every
Negro citizen in Panola County, except two, who wish to become registered
voters must satisfy the stricter requirements of today's law.
What, then, is the court's duty in such a situation? Ordinary principles
of fairness and justice seem to indicate the correct answer. Would anyone
doubt the utter unfairness of permitting the unrestricted application by the
state of higher and stricter standards of eligibility to all of the Negroes of the
county where 70%o of the white voters of the county have qualified under
simple standards or no standards at all, and where the Negro citizens were
prevented from qualifying under the simpler standards by reason of a prac-
tice or pattern of discrimination?
54
The court noted that the only adequate remedy was to allow Negroes to register
if they possessed the qualifications previously required of white applicants.
Technically, the Government might have argued that since white illiterates
had been allowed to register, black illiterates should be accorded the same right.
However, for reasons of strategy, and perhaps because any remedy which ignored
state law requirements (e.g., that applicants interpret the Constitution in order
to register) seemed drastic as well as unprecedented, the United States asked
only that the registrar be required to register every Negro who could demonstrate
a reasonable ability to read and write. The appellate court agreed and ordered
the district judge to enter the requested decree. Negroes were not required to
take the test required by state law, at least until the effects of past discrimination
had been dissipated.5 Instead, they were permitted to register, if they were able
to fill out the simple informational parts of the application form with reasonable
assistance from the registrar. A few months after the order, more than 1,200
Panola County Negroes had registered, putting the lie to the shibboleth that
southern blacks do not want to vote.
In addition to suing dozens of local registrars, Civil Rights Division lawyers
brought state-wide suits against Louisiana and Mississippi in an effort to have
the constitutional interpretation test provisions such as in both states declared un-
constitutional and permit the registration of all minimally literate Negroes. In
United States v. Mississippi" the Division encountered a hostile trial court,
which, incredibly, dismissed the action on the pleadings alone; the Supreme Court
unanimously reinstated the complaint with some caustic comments for the
recalcitrant jurists below. The Louisiana55 case, however, came to the Court on
an appeal by the state from a decision in favor of the United States. The trial
54 Id. at 768.
55 Initially, the Court ordered that the relaxed standards for Negroes remain in effect
only for one year, on the theory that the victims of discrimination would have an adequate
opportunity to register during that period. As appears in the text below, however, events pro-
ceeded so fast that the constitutional interpretation test was never reinstituted in Panola County.
56 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
57 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965), rev'g 229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Miss.
1964).
58 United States v. State of Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963), aff'd, 380
U.S. 145 (1965). The district court opinion is particularly instructive as to the historical
setting of the problem.
[October, 19721
RELIEF IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES
court, after holding that the constitutional interpretation test in effect in particular
parishes (counties) was discriminatory and unconstitutional, ordered Louisiana
not to give Negroes any registration test in those parishes which was more
difficult than that which had been given to whites during the period of discrimina-
tion (i.e., practically no test at all). Louisiana appealed the decree, but the
Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.5" Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the
Court, approved the order of the court below, observing that a court of equity
not only has "the power but the duty to render a decree which will, so far as
possible, eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like dis-
crimination in the future."'8 So far as relief in civil rights cases is concerned, that
sentence says it all.
The Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana was announced within a few
days of events in Selma, Alabama, which made voting discrimination a matter
of the most urgent public concern. Four years of intensive Justice Department
litigation in Dallas County, of which Selma is the county seat, had raised Negro
registration only from 1% to 2.5% of the eligible black adults."1 Negroes pro-
testing the denial of the right to vote as well as some white supporters attempted
to march from Selma to Montgomery, the state capital, to confront Gover-
nor George Wallace with their demands for justice. The marchers were
clubbed down 2 by officers led by Jim Clark, the sheriff of Dallas County who
wore a lapel button which said "Never," in obvious reference to his view of when
Negroes should have equal rights. President Johnson, in a historic speech in
which he embraced the slogan of the Negro revolution "we shall overcome,"
pressed for the immediate enactment of a comprehensive Voting Rights Act
which would put an end to all discrimination in voting registration. In August of
1965, by an overwhelming majority, Congress enacted the law. 3 The principle of
Louisiana-the comprehensive correction of past inequities-was the central
theme of the legislation. Since the Civil Rights Division's lawsuits had shown that
illiterate whites had been registered in large numbers, the Act suspended all
literacy tests and similar devices for a five-year period in particular states and
counties selected by a formula which covered all those states in which discrim-
inatory application of literacy tests had been a factor." The effect of this
suspension was to allow even illiterate citizens to register, and thus potentially
to enfranchise virtually every Negro. The Act also authorized the Attorney Gen-
eral to assign federal voting examiners to accomplish registration of voters in those
areas where local officials were reluctant to comply with the new law.
The Supreme Court promptly sustained the constitutionality of the Voting
Rights Act."5 Black citizens enthusiastically responded to the new law. In
Mississippi, for example, the percentage of Negroes registered to vote quickly
climbed from about 5% to well over 50%. Black officials were elected in con-
59 Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
60 Id. at 154.
61 The Supreme Court cited the slow rate of progress in Dallas County as justification for
the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314-15 (1966).
62 See the vivid description of this event in Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D.
Ala. 1965).
63 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.
64 See id. § 1973b et seq.
65 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
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siderable numbers all over the South, and white candidates, fearful of offending
black voters, no longer yelled "Nigger !" in order to win an election. One of the
first casualties of the Voting Rights Act was Sheriff Clark, whose excesses had
done so much to bring about the Act. He lost his bid for re-election when
his supporters failed in their attempt to disqualify the votes of federally regis-
tered blacks. 6
In 1969, the Supreme Court went one step further and ruled in Gaston
County v. United States" that a simple literacy test was impermissible where
blacks had been accorded inferior educational opportunities for many years,
because such a test placed a greater burden on the black community than on the
white. In 1970, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act for five years, and
recognized the implications of Gaston County by amending the Act to suspend
literacy tests throughout the nation. The Supreme Court sustained the consti-
tutionality of this nationwide suspension of literacy tests.6" It now seems unlikely
that significant numbers of prospective voters will be denied the right to vote be-
cause of discrimination against them on account of the color of their skin, either
directly by prejudiced officials, or indirectly by reason of unequal educational
opportunities.
The right to vote has been said to be of paramount importance because
it is "preservative of all rights."69 To some extent, this has proved to be true
by the American experience. Those blacks who were denied the right to vote
were denied other rights as well. There can be no doubt that, with the vote, the
southern Negro can influence decisions affecting his well-being far more effec-
tively than he could when he was disfranchised. One of the earliest and most
visible consequences of the Voting Rights Act in Mississippi was the proper
maintenance, for the first time, of roads and driveways in black communities.
Nevertheless, there are limits.
Blacks have voted in the North without serious difficulty for many decades,
but racial discrimination in housing and in employment has persisted until the
teeming ghettoes of northern cities are regarded by many as more oppressive
than the rural South. The Voting Rights Act has largely secured the right to
vote for all Americans, but the Negro has not yet achieved equality of opportu-
nity. The Civil Rights Division is striving to secure for Negroes (as well as for
Mexican Americans, American Indians, and members of other minority groups)
equal opportunity in education, employment, housing and other areas. Here,
as in voting, the keystone to meaningful results has proved to be the proposition
so aptly expressed in Louisiana-there exists a duty not only to discontinue dis-
criminatory practices, but also to correct the effects of past discrimination.
66 United States v. Executive Comm. of Dem. Party of Dallas Co., Ala., 254 F. Supp. 537
(S.D. Ala. 1966).
67 395 U.S. 285 (1969). The decision involved an attempt by a county in North Carolina
to free itself from the coverage of the Voting Rights Act on the ground, that a literacy test
had not been used in the five years preceding the suit to abridge the right to vote on
account of race. The Court held that, in view of state imposed educational deprivations for
Negroes, the literacy test could not be reinstated.
68 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
69 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
561-62 (1964).
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B. The Right to Equal Educational Opportunity
For a decade after the Supreme Court's school desegration decision of 1954,
most schools in the South remained completely segregated. The federal govern-
ment had no statutory authority to bring school desegregation suits, and Negroes
had few resources to initiate cases of their own. In 1955, the Supreme Court
softened the impact of its epoch-making decision of the previous year by holding
that the duty to disestablish dual school systems need not be carried out im-
mediately, but must be accomplished "with all deliberate speed."7 Granted the
difficulty of changing established mores overnight, the holding that the denial
of any constitutional right may continue even for a limited time was quite out of
the ordinary and undoubtedly gave some encouragement to those who worked
to resist." Moreover, the prevailing view of the lower federal courts, to which
the Supreme Court initially gave some limited comfort," was that the Constitu-
tion did not require integration, but merely forbade enforced segregation."8
Under this thesis, school boards had no affirmative obligation to do anything
about segregated schools until sued by someone. If a Negro tried to attend an
all-white school, he generally had to surmount complex and endless state admin-
istrative procedures before a federal court would listen to his case. At the end of
this process, if he still was of school age, he might or might not be admitted, but no
other changes would be made in the underlying segregated school system. 4 By
1964, the Supreme Court had become so irritated with the progress which had
been made that it commented that "there has been altogether too much delibera-
tion and not enough speed" in the desegregation of southern school systems. 5
In the same year, Congress conditioned eligibility for federal financial
assistance on compliance with desegregation requirements and, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare, which was charged with administering federal
aid to education, issued guidelines with which school districts were supposed to
comply in order to obtain federal funds." These guidelines were accorded great
weight by the courts;77 however, they brought about little more than token
70 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). This decision is generally known as
Brown I. See Justice Black's criticism of Brown II in Alexander v. Board of Education, 396
U.S. 1218 (1969). See also Price v. Denison Independent School District Bd. of Ed., 348 F.2d
1010 (5th Cir. 1965).
71 See, e.g., Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark.), rev'd, 257 F.2d 33 "(8th Cir.),
aff'd, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Following violent white reaction to the admission of black pupils to
a school in Little Rock, Arkansas, a federal district court ordered the postponement of desegre-
gation. Both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court, however, emphatically reversed this
accommodation to unlawful resistance to constitutional requirements.
72 See e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Bd. of Education, 358 U.S. 101, aff'g 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D.
Ala. 1958).
73 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
74 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Rd. of Education, 358 U.S. 101 '(1958), for the kinds of
dilatory procedures which even the Supreme Court tolerated four years after the 1954 school
desegregation cases. See also Evers v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 328 F.2d
408 (5th Cir. 1964).
75 Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
76 45 C.F.R. § 151.1 et seq. (1972).
77 E.g., Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir.
1965); United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966),
aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
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desegregation in most areas of the South. Under influence of the more restrictive
interpretations of what Brown required, the guidelines permitted desegregation
to proceed, at least for a transitional period, under a system known as "freedom
of choice." Under the free choice plan, pupils in the various school districts were
permitted the right to attend any school in the district selected by them or their
parents, whether or not that school was previously maintained exclusively for
members of their race.
While democratic in theory, the free choice plan worked out less effectively
in practice. "[I]f choice influencing factors are not eliminated, freedom of choice
is a fantasy." 8 In some school districts, economic pressures and acts of violence
directed against Negroes by the Ku Klux Klan and other segregationist groups
made freedom of choice illusory, and the courts eventually directed the school
districts to desegregate by some other means, such as unitary attendance zones
under which pupils of all races attended their neighborhood schools.79 Even in
the absence of overt intimidation, whites in areas where segregation had been
a fact of life did not elect to attend previously all-black schools and that was
undoubtedly why southern school boards elected freedom of choice plans. Under
other methods of desegregation, such as unitary zoning, whites would have to
go to the formerly all-black schools in their neighborhoods and could no longer
be bused past such schools on their way to white schools in other parts of the
county. O° Such busing had been the only means by which segregation could be
preserved. Moreover, the continued existence of segregated teaching staffs also
encouraged pupils to remain in schools composed of their own race because, as
one court so aptly observed," a school with an all-black faculty is as plainly
identified as a "black school" as if the word "colored" were emblazoned above
the school's entrance. Because the school boards gave pupils and their parents
what amounted to a choice between white and black schools, the results of the
choice were preordained. There was usually token integration in the white schools
and complete segregation in the black ones.
In 1968, the constitutionality of freedom of choice plans was argued before
the United States Supreme Court. The Department of Justice, as amicus curiae,
contended that the plans were unlawful unless they resulted in substantial de-
segregation. The principal case before the Court involved New Kent County, a
small rural county which had only two schools, one for white students and the
other for Negroes. The all-black school was located in one part of the county,
while the white school was in another part. There was little or no residential
78 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 479 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd
sub nom., Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
79 Coppedge v. Franklin County Board of Education, 273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C. 1967),
aff'd, 394 F.24 410 (4th Cir.), application for stay pending appeal denied, 293 F. Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir. 1968); Singleton v. Anson County Board of
Education, 283 F. Supp. 895 (W.D.N.C. 1968); United States v. Farrar, 414 F.2d 936 (5th
Cir. 1969).
80 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458, 479, n. 27 (M.D. Ala.),
aff'd sub nom., Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); United States v. Jefferson
County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'd en banc, 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 340 (1967).
81 Kier v. County School Board of Augusta County, Va., 249 F. Supp. 239, 246-48 (W.D.
Va. 1966).
82 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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segregation and, for the most part, whites and blacks lived adjacent to each other.
After the freedom of choice plan had been in operation for three years, about
15 % of the black pupils attended the white school-an unusually high percentage
for a southern rural school district-but no whites attended the black school.
Teaching staffs remained segregated. White pupils who lived near the black
school were bused across the county to the white school, and most black pupils
who lived near the white school continued to ride buses in the opposite direction.
Both a zoning plan, based on "neighborhood schools," and a consolidation plan,
based on the "pairing" of grades in the two schools, would have completely inte-
grated the system. The Supreme Court determined that on the basis of the fore-
going facts and the holding in Louisiana, New Kent County had an obligation
not only to allow Negroes to attend formerly all-white schools, but also to take
any affirmative action necessary to eliminate the dual school system. 3 The school
district's freedom of choice plan was held constitutionally inadequate. The Court
found it constitutionally insufficient to use a plan under which substantial segre-
gation continued where there were educationally plausible ways to desegregate the
schools. Accordingly, the county was ordered to adopt and implement an alter-
native plan, such as unitary zoning or pairing, in order to bring about a system
in which there would be no schools designated for either white or black attend-
ance. 
8
The Court expressly held in Alexander v. Board of Educationsr in 1969
that delays in desegregation of public schools were no longer tolerable. By the
fall of 1970, the dual system of white and black schools had been largely elim-
inated in most of the southern rural counties, and virtually every school in such
areas had become biracial."6
Still awaiting authoritative resolution is the complex and often emotion-
alized problem of urban school segregation, which generally results from racial
residential patterns. Assignment of pupils to schools on the basis of the location
of their homes appears on its face to be fair and nondiscriminatory. But what
if the underlying residential segregation results from racial discrimination in the
housing market? Is assignment of pupils to schools on the basis of their residence
nondiscriminatory where state and local agencies have promoted residential




84 Id. at 339, 442.
85 396 U.S. 19 (1969). For an eloquent opinion by Mr. Justice Black at an earlier stage
of the case, see 396 U.S. 1218 (1969).
86 Mr. Elliott Richardson, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, announced on
January 14, 1971, that there was, in effect, more actual school desegregation in the South
than in the North. He stated that 38.1% of black pupils in 11 states of the old Confederacy
were attending majority white schools, compared with 27.7% in 32 northern and western
states. San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1971. at 11, col. 3.
87 For a striking description of federal policies which have intentionally segregated neigh-
borhoods (until the late 1940's, the FHA actively encouraged the use of racially restrictive
covenants for federally assisted housing), see Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond,
Va., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972), rez'd, - F.2d - (4th Cir., June 5, 1972). See
also Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d
731 (7th Cir. 1971); Shannon v. United States Dept. of Housing & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d
809 (3rd Cir. 1970).
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The Supreme Court has determined that school boards may be required to
eliminate the effects on school districts from past state-imposed racial segrega-
tion by taking any reasonable steps, including busing.' As this article goes to
press the courts have yet to decide whether such relief is appropriate in districts
where schools were never segregated by law, but which in fact may well be
more rigidly segregated as a result of housing patterns.8 9 It is surely quixotic
to argue that blacks live in ghettoes and go to all-black schools in Charlotte,
North Carolina, by compulsion, but live and learn together in the black districts
and schools of Chicago by choice.9 If the purpose of school desegregation
decrees is to equalize and improve educational opportunities for schoolchildren,
then the question whether large scale transportation of pupils should be required
to eliminate segregation resulting from racial residential patterns should be
resolved on the basis of whether such transportation helps the children, and
resolved uniformly in the North, South, East, and West, without regard to
whether segregation was formerly decreed by law.
C. The Right to Equal Employment Opportunity
When Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'
which prohibits racial discrimination in employment, it forbade practices which
had been theretofore generally accepted as lawful,9" at least in those states and
municipalities which did not have local fair employment laws or ordinances.
Obviously, some of the effects of pre-Act discrimination would continue after
the effective date of the Act, and practices which appeared fair on their face
could operate in a discriminatory fashion when superimposed on the pre-Act
pattern. One of the principal issues to which courts had to address themselves
in the early days of the Act was whether affirmative corrective action was re-
quired to eliminate the effects of pre-Act discrimination.
Before the Act, many companies tended to assign black employees to de-
partments in which the work was harder and the pay was lower. Since these
88 Swam v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). On August 18, 1972, after this
article went to press, the U.S. House voted 282 to 102 to ban crosstown busing of school chil-
dren.
89 Lower courts have not been unanimous on this question. Compare Bell v. School City
of Gary, Ind., 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964) with Davis v.
School District of City of Pontiac, Inc., 443 F.2d 573 "(6th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 309 F. Supp. 734
(E.D. Mich. 1970) and Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District, 339 F. Supp. 1315
(N.D. Cal. 1971).
90 The litigation over where public housing should be located in the Chicago area dis-
closes the remarkable degree to which the ghetto is the result of state action. See Gautreaux
v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971); Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.
Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967), motion for summary judgment granted, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D.
Ill.), judgment order, 304 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970).
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
92 Some recent decisions, however, have found racial discrimination in employment to be
a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), as well as to Title VII.
See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Wks. of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970); Young v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 1971);
Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Gaston County
Dyeing Machine Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Medical Soc'y of South
Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969); Dobbins v. Local 212, Int'l Bro. of Elec. Wkrs.,
292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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employees were not permitted to transfer to white departments, and most com-
panies had separate white and black seniority lists, an employee's race had an
effect on his job security and on his pay. After discrimination in employment
was prohibited, many employers who recognized their obligation to end racial
assignments to specific departments allowed blacks to transfer to formerly
white jobs. Often, however, seniority continued to be determined by length
of time in the department and not by the length of service with the company.
In fact, this was a rather typical provision of collective bargaining agreements
with labor unions. As a result, if a Negro with twenty years in a company
transferred to a previously white job, his seniority would be lower than that
of a white employee hired the previous week. Obviously, this practice inhibited
transfers and tended to prolong and perpetuate racial segregation at the plant.
On the other hand, the whites already in a white department had an expec-
tation of a particular seniority which would be adversely affected through no
fault of their owns if Negroes with greater plant seniority, but less time in the
department, were permitted to move ahead of them on the seniority list. In
times of low employment, displaced whites might be laid off under circumstances
in which their existing seniority would have protected their jobs.
Despite the problem which this situation presented, the courts were un-
willing to construe the Act restrictively so as to permit discrimination suffered by
blacks before the Act to have the effect of confining them in segregated depart-
ments for a generation thereafter. Instead, they held that, at least as a general
principle, Negroes transferring to jobs for which they were qualified, but from
which they had previously been excluded because of race, were entitled to
plant seniority at their new job. 4 The reasoning of the courts was akin to
that of Louisiana, but went beyond it. In the voting cases, the defendants were
required to correct the continuing discriminatory consequences of discrimination
which was always unlawful. In employment cases, affirmative steps were ordered
to undo discrimination which was thought lawful at the time of its occurrence.
To put it another way, the companies were required to end not only practices
which were openly discriminatory on their face, but also those which had dis-
criminatory consequences because of the context in which they operated.
Labor unions are also subject to the prohibitions against discrimination in
employment. Some craft unions, notably in the building and construction trades,
have a long history of discriminatory policies and practices.' When the Act
was passed, many local unions were all-white and some had restrictions which
tended to perpetuate that situation.96 In some unions, only the sons or other
93 For a rather poignant statement of this position by a white worker in a letter to the
judge, see United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers Int'l U., L. U., 341 F. Supp. 694,
697 (S.D. N.Y. 1972).
94 United States v. Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperwork, 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.
La. 1968), aff'd, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505 (E.D. Va. 1968); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
95 See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002
(E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (uphold-
ing numerical hiring "goals" in the construction industry because of past exclusion of blacks).
96 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int'l Ass'n, Local U. 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Int'l Bro. of Elec. Wkrs., L. No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.




relatives of current members would be taken on as apprentices or journey-
men." The constitutions of particular unions required that each new member
be approved by a vote of the membership. While these unions generally con-
ducted hiring halls which gave out work to persons in the trade whether
or not they were union members, in many instances the rules gave preference
to individuals with prior experience under union contracts.
All of the foregoing practices were racially neutral on their face and did
not in and of themselves discriminate against Negroes. Given an all-white union,
however, blacks were at an obvious disadvantage. Obviously, few blacks were
eligible to join unions which practiced nepotism. Subjecting a black applicant
to a vote of the membership was analogous to trying a Negro before an all-white
jury from which blacks had been systematically excluded." Moreover, giving
a hiring hall preference to someone with experience under a union agreement is
inherently discriminatory where blacks had not been allowed to join the union.
While many whites may also be put at a disadvantage by these practices, they
operate in the context of an all-white union, against virtually all Negroes. Hold-
ing that the Civil Rights Act deals with the continuing post-Act consequences
of pre-Act discriminatory practices, the courts have set aside these ostensibly
nondiscriminatory requirements.9" The unions protested that all that was needed
to end unlawful practices was to prohibit discrimination, but the courts have
disagreed: "[For] a forceful prohibition against discrimination, [defendants]
need look no further than the Civil Rights Act itself.' 10 0
Specific application in employment discrimination cases of the principle
that affirmative steps must be taken to correct the effects of past discriminatory
practices often poses difficult problems. Preferential treatment for any group to
achieve racial balance in employment is specifically prohibited.'0 ' It has been
held, however, that something in the nature of a quota may be appropriate relief
in cases of deliberate exclusion. Where a union, for example, excluded blacks
and Spanish Americans for many years, it has been held to be appropriate
relief to require it to take on minority members and whites for a limited period
on a one-to-one ratio to compensate for the past.' The Department of Labor
has recently promulgated programs like the so-called Philadelphia Plan, which
97 See, e.g., Local 53 Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969).
98 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953).
99 See, e.g., Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969), aff'g sub nom. 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967); United States v. Sheet
Metal Wkrs. Int'l Ass'n, Local U. 36, 416 F.2d 123 "(8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Int'l
Bro. of Elec. Wkrs., L. No. 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. United Ass'n of Journ. & App. of
P. & P.F.I., 314 F. Supp. 160 '(S.D. Ind. 1969); United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lathers
Int'l U., Loc. U. No. 46, 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), motion for stay pending appeal
denied, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
100 Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051
(5th Cir. 1969).
101 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
102 Local 53 of Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost I. & A. Wkrs. v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th
Cir. 1969), aff'g sub nom. 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967); accord, United States v. Iron-
workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3557 (U.S. May 23, 1972). United States v. Wood, Wire
& Metal Lathers Int'l U., L. U. 46, 341 F. Supp. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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requires contractors on federal construction projects to take affirmative steps
to meet specific minority employment goals loosely based on the percentage
of blacks in the overall population. Obviously, such programs necessitate
preferential recruitment in the non-white community to meet the goals. While
some officials, including the Comptroller General of the United States, have
contended that these goals amount to reverse discrimination by an unlawful
quota, the Philadelphia Plan has survived its judicial test.
10 3
In order to deal with indirect, almost intangible, discrimination as well as
with overt exclusion, the courts have begun to address themselves to the problem
of "image." When an employer or union can be shown to have operated in
such a manner that the inevitable effect has been to deter Negroes or other non-
whites from seeking employment or membership, it has been held that affirma-
tive steps--generally systematic contacts with the non-white community-are
necessary in order to correct the discriminatory image. Moreover, such steps
have been required even when the membership practices which created the
all-white image are of the pre-Act variety-their consequences linger onO
As experience under the Act expands, the questions become even more
difficult. The courts have been faced, for example, with the problem whether
a test for prospective employees, which is more difficult for Negroes than for
whites because the former have had inferior educational opportunities, is dis-
criminatory if it is not reasonably related to the requirements of the job. Basically,
the question is whether an employer must conduct his operation so as to correct
rather than to capitalize on the effects of someone else's discriminatory acts10
One should not be required to employ incompetent non-white surgeons, archi-
tects, or pilots because their educational opportunities were inferior. Is it not
unreasonable, on the other hand, to deny a black whose opportunities for decent
schooling were negligible a job working with his hands because he cannot solve
quadratic equations? The Supreme Court has, in effect, recently ruled that it
is, holding in the landmark Griggs"' case that such a test is unlawful if its use
has the effect of placing blacks at a disadvantage in obtaining a job, unless the
employer can show that the test is reasonably job related. The employer is
thus obliged to take reasonable steps to correct the consequences of past discrimi-
nation in education against the Negro, even though he was not the discriminator
and even though he did not intend to discriminate. Effect, not intent, is con-
trolling, for, as Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court, Title VII
forbids discriminatory consequences as well as motivations.
How far does the Griggs principle go? A California employer refused to
103 Contractors Ass'n of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
104 United States v. Sheet Metal Wkrs. Int'l Ass'n, Local U. 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir.
1969); United States v. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969);
United States v. United Ass'n of Journ. & App. of P. & P.F.I., 314 F. Supp. 160 (S.D. Ind.
1969); United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532 (W.D.N.D. 1971); cf.
Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
105 Cf. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test discriminatory
where Negroes were denied equal education opportunity); Brewer v. School Board of City of
Norfolk, Va., 397 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1968) (neighborhood school plan may be unlawful where
neighborhoods are segregated because of private discrimination in housing).
106 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
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hire individuals with arrest records, regardless of the color of their skin. The
court held that this practice violated Title VII since arrest does not prove guilt,
since blacks are unjustly arrested more frequently than whites, and since no busi-
ness necessity was shown for this requirement.0 7 Another employer refused to
employ persons whose wages had been garnished, claiming that the burdensome
administrative problems presented for its payroll personnel justified such exclu-
sion. The court held the policy unlawful, citing its disproportionate impact on
non-whites, and holding that the administrative difficulty complained of was not
germane to the employee's ability to do the job. The court further suggested
that the cycle of racial discrimination pervades all walks of life, and that Title VII
requires the employer to contribute to its alleviation, even at some administrative
disadvantage to himself."5
But the individual employer did not personally create all of the disadvan-
tages which confront non-whites in the job market, and there must be limits to
what he will be required to do about them. In general, an employer need not
hire individuals convicted of crime, at least where there is a reasonable relation-
ship between the crime and the capacity to satisfy the job requirements."' 9
Where a practice perpetuates the effects of the employer's past discrimination,
it may be justified only on the showing of a compelling business necessity.'
When the vice of a challenged practice, however, lies in its disproportionate
statistical impact on non-whites rather than in any conscious discrimination by
the employer, the standard is apparently somewhat less exacting."' One of the
primary tasks awaiting courts in the 1970's is to fashion reasonable rules, fair to
all concerned, as to the scope of the employer's obligation to assure equal oppor-
tunity by compensating for discrimination practiced by someone else.
D. The Right to Equal Housing Opportunity
In 1968, Congress closed the last major gap in existing civil rights legislation
by enacting the Fair Housing Act,"2 which prohibits discrimination on account
of race, color, religion or national origin in the sale and rental of virtually all
housing, private and public alike. This civil rights law is undoubtedly one of the
most important ever enacted by Congress. The difficulties inherent in integrating
schools, particularly in urban centers, stem largely from residential segregation.
There is also a growing trend in the nation for employment to move from the in-
creasingly black inner cities to traditionally white suburbs. Unless non-white
citizens can live in these suburbs, equal job opportunities become illusory. In
the wake of the wave of riots in the segregated ghettoes of American cities, the
107 Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
108 Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
109 Richardson v. Hotel Corp. of America, 332 F. SuDp. 519 (E.D. La. 1971).
110 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
111 Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972); Castro v. Beecher, 459
F.2d 725 (lst Cir. 1972), rezrg 334 F. Supp. 930 (D. Mass. 1971).
112 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1970). While there are some minor exemptions from cover-
age of the Act, racial discrimination with respect to exempt dwellings is still prohibited by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Harris v. Jones, 296 F. Supp. 1082 (D.
Mass. 1969); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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Kerner Commission 1 3 found the nation drifting towards "two societies, one black,
one white-separate and unequal." Unless equal opportunity in housing be-
comes a reality, it is difficult to see how this trend can be reversed.
Application of principles of affirmative relief from other areas of civil rights
law is not simple. In voting cases, the doctrine of Louisiana v. United States"
has assured that blacks must be permitted to register if they meet actual white
standards. No serious practical problem is presented even if this doubles the
number of persons on the voting rolls. Schools in many segregated school districts
can be reorganized into a unitary system by the reassignment of pupils and
teachers without causing unreasonable dislocation." 5 In employment discrimi-
nation cases, the affirmative relief principle can also be invoked to eliminate
practices which build on and perpetuate past discrimination, and in most in-
stances such remedies are compatible with the practical operation of the business.
In those cases in which some continuing consequences of past discrimination in
employment are necessary from a business standpoint, the courts reluctantly
tolerate them." 6
In some respects, it is even harder to counteract the effects of discriminatory
housing practices than it is to eliminate other forms of discrimination. The voting
analogy does not work in a full "white only" apartment house, for only a sped-
fied number of people can live there and, no matter how egregious the wrongs
of yesterday, blacks cannot be moved into a full house today without incumbent
tenants being put out on the street. The school analogy also has shortcomings;
it is obviously completely impracticable to uproot people from their homes to
promote residential integration, and the Fair Housing Act contemplates no
such remedy. Accordingly it was earnestly contended in the early days of the
Act that affirmative relief was inappropriate in housing discrimination cases and
that courts should restrict themselves to prohibitory injunctions."' There was
no established body of law supporting affirmative relief under state and local
fair housing legislation, and, in general, the appellate courts had neither granted
nor apparently considered such remedies in arguably analogous cases involving
discrimination at places of public accommodation." 8 Nevertheless, discrimination
in housing can often be self-perpetuating. Tenants in an all-white apartment
113 REPORT OF TE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVnL DISOraDERS (1968).
114 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
115 Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
116 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
117 See, e.g., Brief for Appellee, United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d
221 (5th Cir. 1971). No affirmative relief was granted in United States v. Mintzes, 304 F.
Supp. 1305 (D. Md. 1969), the Government's first "blockbusting" case, although this may
have been attributable to a peculiar set of facts. The continuing consequences of the proved
unlawful conduct in that case were minimal.
118 See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964). But see United States ex rel. Clark v. Gramer, 418 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1969), which
cited with apparent approval consent decrees negotiated by the United States which granted
some affirmative relief, such as the posting of "nondiscrimination signs" and the closing of
kitchen facilities maintained for service to blacks during the period when they were excluded
from dining room facilities. See also United States v. Beach Associates, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 801
(D. Md. 1968); United States v. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C.
1969) (recognizing the obligation of operators of previously segregated public accommodations
to inform the public and the non-white community of their opportunity to use the facilities,
and ordering the posting of signs and other steps).
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complex will tend to bring in white friends, and the process operates to exclude
non-whites. Blacks are likely to be deterred from applying to an establishment
with an all-white image. An injunction against a real estate company may have
little practical effect if its potential beneficiaries know nothing about it, and
a black man receives little benefit from opportunities which are not brought to
his attention. Accordingly, it was the position of the Civil Rights Division from
the first that affirmative relief is appropriate in fair housing cases to correct past
discrimination and that its prime goal should be the communication to affected
persons of their opportunities for housing.
Many of the Justice Department's suits are concluded by consent decree,
without the need for a trial, and the early consent decrees shaped the character
of the remedy in fair housing cases. The first cases which pioneered relief in-
volved so-called land sales companies. The defendants" 9 were developers of
lakeside properties who solicited purchasers for lots on which they would build
second homes. Their pitch was to city dwellers, and they offered frustrated resi-
dents opportunities to escape the ills of urban living. To some whites, those ills
are not all nonracial. In suits alleging discriminatory practices by several such
companies, the United States moved for preliminary relief, and filed supporting
affidavits by the defendants' former telephone solicitors and salesmen. These
affidavits disclosed that the employees were under orders not to solicit Negroes
as purchasers, for it was feared that sales to blacks would imperil the white
market. The affiants were directed to give black prospects misleading informa-
tion to minimize the likelihood that they would try to purchase lots. Whites
would be urged to attend sales dinners, but blacks were told that the dinners
were cancelled. Bonuses were given to telephone solicitors for securing white
prospects, but there was no reward for obtaining black ones. Records were
coded to facilitate these practices. Double-X meant suspected black, and cards
of confirmed blacks were to be thrown away so that they would not be urged
to buy. Unsurprisingly, the discriminatory policy often extended to the defend-
ants' employment practices. The policies were successful, and there were usually
either no black purchasers or a really token number, like two of 1500.
The defendants in these suits usually denied any discriminatory policies,
at least for the record, but in most instances they elected not to litigate. Even-
tually, consent decrees were negotiated which required compensatory steps to
eliminate the effects of the past. Discrimination in housing and in employment
was prohibited. Employees had to sign nondiscrimination pledges, and objective,
nonracial sales criteria were ordered, so that blacks could not be turned down
for subjective or capricious reasons. A reasonable proportion of the defendants'
solicitation effort-thirty percent in the landmark case-was to be directed to
the black community. All advertising was required to state defendants' non-
discriminatory policies. Full page ads were to be placed in black newspapers.
If any advertisements depicted persons enjoying the property, both races were
required to be represented. Also, contacts were to be made with the N.A.A.C.P.,
119 Since these companies negotiated the consent decrees in good faith, the author prefers
not to identify them, notwithstanding that the facts described herein are a matter of public
record.
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Urban League, and other organizations representing the black community.
Systematically, the defendants were obligated to assure that nonwhites who
could afford their lots had an informed opportunity to purchase. In general, the
decrees were governed by the principle that the more extreme the discrimination
was before the suit, the more comprehensive the relief that was appropriate to
correct it.
The affirmative marketing for which the consent decrees provided was, in
most cases, remarkably successful. Lakesides became integrated. Most of the
defendants had sold fewer than one percent of their lots to blacks before they
came under court order, but their sales to blacks reached twenty percent or
more after the initiation of a court ordered affirmative program. Soon, consent
decrees based on similar affirmative marketing principles were negotiated with
major defendants engaged in the ownership and management of apartments, 2 °
sale of homes,"2' and financing of housing. 2 Thus, even before there was any
authoritative decisional law on the point, a series of consent decrees all over the
United States had made affirmative relief of this kind the norm rather than the
exception.
In United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp.,:" the United States had
sued the operators of a 96 unit apartment complex in Atlanta, Georgia charging
exclusion of blacks. The District judge dismissed the suit, but the Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that a pattern and practice of racial discrimination
had been established. Rejecting defendants' contention that only a prohibitory
injunction was appropriate, the Court of Appeals took the comparatively unusual
step of asking the parties to propose a specific decree. The United States sug-
gested affirmative relief of the character discussed above, bringing its consent
decrees to the Court's attention. Eventually, the appellate court ordered the
District Judge to enter an order which it had prepared for him word for word.
The order drew heavily on the prior consent decrees. In addition to enjoining
discrimination in the future, it required instructions to defendants' employees,
and to agencies which secured tenants for defendants, as to their duty not to
discriminate. The operators of the apartment complex were directed to adopt
and implement objective, reviewable, nondiscriminatory rental standards. Fair
housing statements were to be included in all advertising and brochures. Defend-
ants were ordered to offer to rent apartments to the specific blacks who had been
discriminatorily excluded. The decree was obviously designed to be a model
120 See, e.g., United States v. Weingart, Civil No. 70-530-CC (C.D. Cal., July 29, 1970).
In this case the operators of more than 9,000 apartments in the Los Angeles area were
ordered not only to invoke most of the steps required by the land sales companies, but also to
give weekly notice to local fair housing councils of vacancies in predominantly white buildings.
This measure greatly increased the opportunities of blacks and Chicanos to rent in white areas.
121 See, e.g., United States v. Homestead Realty, Inc., Civil No. 71-C-205 (N.D. Ill., Feb.
25, 1971).
122 See United States v. Household Finance Corp., Civil No. 72-C-515 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 29,
1972). In this consent decree, HFC was required to include in its advertisements that it was an
equal opportunity lender and to take steps to communicate its policies to the American Indian,
Spanish-speaking, and black communities.
123 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971). While there had been some prior intimations that the
Louisiana principle applied to housing discrimination, see Kennedy Park Homes v. City of
Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
den. 401 U.S. 1010 (1971), the definitive decision was West Peachtree.
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for district courts in similar cases,12 and it established conclusively that prohibi-
tory relief was insufficient.
Fair housing is a complex area, and adaptation of the West Peachtree
principles to varying factual situations raises interesting questions. A common
problem is the "steering" of blacks to certain areas and whites to others. In United
States v. Life Realty, Inc.,'25 the Government sued one of New York's largest
real estate operators in which it alleged that the defendants' rental office in-
formed white applicants of vacancies only in all-white or predominantly white
apartment complexes, while blacks and Puerto Ricans were channelled to build-
ings in black or racially transitional areas. Defendants denied the charges, and
negotiated a consent decree without any adjudication of the merits. The de-
cree prohibited discrimination, required some affirmative marketing, and pro-
vided for a system of posting vacancies and maintaining a log of applicants
which was designed to prevent "steering."
Additionally, the United States sought relief which would put the victims
of the alleged "steering" in their "rightful place" by allowing them to transfer
from black to white buildings with defendants paying the moving expenses. The
defendants resisted this proposal on the ground that it would imply an admission
of wrongdoing on their part, but did agree to encourage desegregation by permit-
ting up to fifty126 persons who had rented at the Negro buildings to break their
lease and to move to white buildings as vacancies occurred, with the landlord
advancing them the equivalent of rent for one month. The decree resulted in
a significant rise in the number of black applicants and about half of them moved
into white buildings, compared with an insignificant percentage who had done
so prior to the order.
The "steering" problem presented in Life Realty, which is even more
common in relation to the sale of single rather than multiple family homes, is
closely related to the iniquitous practice popularly known as "blockbusting." An
important provision of the Fair Housing Act' makes it unlawful, for profit, to
sell or rent a dwelling by representing that non-whites are moving into the neigh-
borhood. The locale of this practice is usually a previously all-white neighbor-
hood into which the first blacks have moved, and in which real estate agents see
an opportunity for listings. The atmosphere in such areas has been colorfully
described by United States District Judge Edenfield in one of the leading deci-
sions:
First, a sense of panic and urgency immediately grips the neighborhood and
rumors circulate and recirculate about the extent of the intrusion (real or
fancied), the effect on property values and the quality of education. Second,
124 It was followed almost verbatim by the court in United States v. Reddoch, Civil No.
6541-71 (S.D. Ala., Jan. 23, 1972), and termed a "model decree" in United States v. Hunter,
459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
125 Civil No. 70-C-964 (E.D.N.Y.. Dec. 22, 1971).
126 Civil rights groups denounced the United States' agreement to the numerical limitation
of 50 families as "pure tokenism." New York Times, Jan. 29, 1971, at 18, col. 3. Only one
black family took advantage of the transfer provision, probably because it is less feasible to
move to a new neighborhood once a pattern of life has been established in one's own com-
munity.
127 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e).
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there are sales and rumors of sales, some true, some false. Third, the frenzied
listing and sale of houses attracts real estate agents like flies to a leaking
jug of honey. Fourth, even those owners who do not sell are sorely tempted
as their neighbors move away, and 'hence those who remain are peculiarly
vulnerable. Fifth, the names of successful agents are exchanged and recom-
mended between homeowners and frequently the agents are called by the
owners themselves, if not to make a listing then at least to get an up-to-date
appraisal. Constant solicitation of listings goes on by all agents either by
house-to-house calls and/or by mail and/or by telephone, to the point where
owners and residents are driven almost to distraction.
In this maelstrom the atmosphere is necessarily charged with Race,
whether mentioned or not, and as a result there is very little cause or neces-
sity for an agent to make direct representations as to race or as to what is
going on. On the contrary both sides already know, all too well, what is
going on. In short, for an agent to get a listing or make a sale because of
racial tensions in such an area is relatively easy, whereas the direct mention
of race in making the sale is superfluous and wholly unnecessary. 28
Under circumstances such as those described by Judge Edenfield, it is
unlikely that a simple prohibition against racial representations designed to induce
sales will adequately correct the unlawful condition. To prevent desegregation
from becoming no more than a short-lived way station between all-white and
all-black, more comprehensive relief is necessary. Accordingly, the decisions
concluding blockbusting cases have not only prohibited unlawful representa-
tions, but have also forbidden more intensive solicitation in transitional areas
than in other neighborhoods, and have also prohibited discriminatory practices
generally, with particular emphasis on prevention of "steering" of blacks into
transitional areas2- 9
There are other housing practices which, although fair and reasonable on
their face, operate in context to discriminate. The operators of an Alabama
apartment complex required prospective tenants to be compatible with persons
living in the complex, all of whom were white; the resident manager was admit-
tedly concerned that rental to blacks would find disfavor among her white ten-
ants. Under these circumstances, this otherwise reasonable criterion was held in-
valid."' In a case involving an all-white, and virtually all-gentile, coopera-
tive apartment complex in the District of Columbia, prospective residents had to
be approved by a vote of persons already owning the apartments; the United
States attacked this provision as discriminatory in its context, and the defendants
eventually agreed to a consent decree requiring objective standards and elimi-
nating the "vote of the tenants" requirement. Subjectivity is inherently suspect,
especially when non-whites are statistically underrepresented, 1s and requirements
128 United States v. Mitchell, 335 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (emphasis in
original).
129 Id. Several consent decrees negotiated by the United States have gone even further
and have prohibited all uninvited solicitation of listings for a stated period in the areas where
the unlawful conduct occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart Realty Co., Civil No. 3-
3589A (N.D. Tex., June 1, 1970); United States v. Arco, Civil No. (1-70-29 (W.D. Tenn.,
Oct. 9, 1970).
130 United States v. Reddoch, Civil No. 6541-71 (S.D. Ala., Jan. 23, 1972).




which place a non-white applicant at the caprice of an all-white group seldom
win favor in the courts." 2 A United States District Judge recently ruled that a
discretionary requirement that applicants for rental at an all-white mobile home
park secure recommendations from incumbent tenants constituted a pattern or
practice of discrimination when applied to exclude two black families, irrespective
of the defendant's motives.' 33
In housing, as in employment, a major area of controversy relates to prac-
tices which, while nondiscriminatory on their face, have a statistically dispropor-
tionate unfavorable impact on non-white citizens. The rights of persons on wel-
fare illustrate this point. In Life Realty, previously discussed, after the consent
decree was in effect, the Attorney General received a complaint that the land-
lord had practiced the blanket exclusion of welfare recipients from the apart-
ments at the Lefrak buildings. The landlord acknowledged this, but denied that
it was unlawful. Lefrak's attorneys argued that this rule had been in effect for
many years and that a majority of welfare recipients in New York had been white
at the time of its inception. In 1971, however, the overwhelming majority of
New York inhabitants on public assistance were black or Puerto Rican. The
United States thus challenged the blanket exclusion under the Griggs doctrine,
contending that it had a discriminatory effect (or statistically disproportionate
racial impact) and that no business necessity existed for it. The Government
agreed that the landlord was entitled to have reasonable income requirements
for prospective tenants, and the original consent decree provided that no tenant
should spend more than 25% of his income on rent. The United States con-
tended that persons on welfare must be accepted for available housing if either
their welfare income complied with the standard or they were able to secure a
rental payment guarantee from an appropriate person or agency. Despite the
landlord's legal views, the consent decree was ultimately amended in accord-
ance with the Government's position. Attorneys for a black welfare mother
later sued the United States and the landlord, charging that the decree had
not gone far enough and that the Attorney General had not enforced the law
with sufficient vigor. The suit was dismissed against the Government, but is
still pending against the landlord." 4
The exclusion of integrated federally assisted housing complexes for families
of low or moderate income from all-white communities has also raised interesting
questions under the Fair Housing Act. The Supreme Court has held that a state
constitutional mandate that such housing be approved by local referendum, while
.other forms of housing are not subjected to such approval, does not on its face
,contravene the fourteenth amendment."3 5 Noting that the requirement was not
aimed at any racial group and that provisions for referenda were common under
,California law, the Court ruled that, absent proof of racial discrimination, such
procedural differentiation between the rich and poor was not constitutionally
equivalent to discrimination founded on race.
132 See, e.g., Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648
(4th Cir. 1967); cf. Seattle Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
133 United States v. Grooms, Civil No. 71-94 (M.D. Fla., July 28, 1972).
134 Boyd v. United States, Civil No. 71-C-1433 (E.D.N.Y., June 7, 1972).
135 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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In many cases, however, the effect of exclusion of federally assisted housing
may be racially discriminatory and while the purpose of a community's action
is never easily ascertainable, "a man is held to intend the foreseeable consequences
of his conduct."13 Accordingly, there is now a substantial body of law holding
that the exclusion of housing of this kind is unlawful if it tends unreasonably to
impede desegregation,'13 7 regardless of the defendant's stated motives. As one
court has stated: "most persons will not admit publicly that they entertain any
bias or prejudice against members of the Negro race.. . ."'I' Plaintiffs have
not been required to prove that overt racially discriminatory statements have
been made. On the contrary, the courts have talked in terms of the discriminatory
consequences of defendants' conduct:
For better or worse, both by legislative act and judicial decision, this
nation is committed to a policy of balanced and dispersed public housing....
Among other things, this reflects the recognition that in the area of public
housing local authorities can no more confine low-income blacks to a com-
pacted and concentrated area than they can confine their children to segre-
gated schools. Moreover, the court in Lackawanna held that even though
the deprivation of plaintiffs' equal housing rights had been caused to some
extent by the sheer neglect and thoughtlessness of local officials, there was,
nevertheless, a violation of the Equal Protection Clause....
Only a showing of compelling governmental interest could overcome
a finding of unconstitutionality in such thoughtlessness and inaction on the
part of municipal officials.
139
As of the present time, the Supreme Court has not addressed itself to prob-
lems of relief under the Fair Housing Act, and the degree to which that statute
requires an affirmative remedy to correct practices which are neutral on their face
but have a discriminatory impact as applied. On the basis of the record to,
date, however, one can predict with relative safety that the approach epitomized
by Louisiana v. United States"4 will dominate the jurisprudence of equal hous-
ing opportunity.
V. The Victim's Remedy
We have come full circle. The Attorney General's authority to initiate civil
rights litigation had its origin in the ineffectiveness of private litigation to secure
equal treatment for blacks. Today, however, the expansion of governmental
action to combat racial discrimination has been accompanied by a major advance
136 Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
137 E.g., Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.
N.Y.), aff'd, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Southern
Alameda Span. Sp. Org. v. City of Union City, Cal., 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Dailey
v. City of Lawton, Okla., 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), aff'g 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D.
Okla. 1969); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Banks v. Perk, 339 F. Supp.
1194 '(N.D. Ohio 1972); see also Sisters of Prov. of St. Mary's of Woods v. City of Evanston,
335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. 111. 1971); United States v. City of Black Jack, Civil No. 71-C-
372(1) (E.D. Mo., Mar. 30, 1972); Parkview Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack - F.2d
-No. 72-1006 (8th Cir. Sept. 25, 1972).
138 Dailey v. City of Lawton, Olda., 296 F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aff'd, 425
F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
139 Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 390-91 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th
Cir. 1972).
140 380 U.S. 145 (1965).
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in the volume of private civil rights litigation. Individual plaintiffs now have an
effective remedy against discriminatory conduct, whether it be public or private.
Congress and the courts have made it easier for a civil rights plaintiff to sue,
even if he has limited financial resources. Under the more recent statutes, a
court may appoint an attorney for the plaintiff, and may authorize the com-
mencement of an action without the payment of fees, costs, or security. 4 More-
over, prevailing plaintiffs are entitled to recover counsel fees, more or less as a
matter of course,' 42 and the amounts awarded have been substantial.'"4
Congress and the courts have also been very generous in defining who has
standing to sue to complain of discriminatory conduct. The laws prohibiting
discrimination in employment and housing confer a right of action upon any
person claiming to have been injured or aggrieved by a discriminatory prac-
tice. 44 This language has been broadly construed to provide standing as broad
as Congress is constitutionally authorized to create, subject only to the Article
III requirement of an actual case or controversy." 5 A Caucasian may, for
example, complain of discrimination against himself based on the race of a black
guest or associate'1 and a pupil has standing to challenge the constitutionality of
a state anti-busing law which impairs his opportunity to associate with students
of another race. 47 Even if there are limits to the liberality with which standing
will be accorded in civil rights litigation, 48 the door is now wide open, and per-
sons and organizations claiming injury from discriminatory practices can generally
find among their number a willing and eligible prospective plaintiff who may
assert his rights in court.
The private civil rights complainant is in a position to litigate for the pur-
pose of improving both his own status and that of other members of his race,
color, religion, or national origin. He may now bring a class action and the
courts have not rigorously required identity of circumstances among all members
of the class.' 9 The Supreme Court has emphasized the public role of the in-
141 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612 (b) (housing), 2000a-3 (a) (public accommodations) and 2000e-
5 (3) (1970) (employment). Congress has also provided a limited administrative remedy with-
out cost to complainants in housing and employment cases. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 2000e-5 (1970).
142 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Lee v. Southern Home-
sites, 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971).
143 E.g., Clark v. American Marine Corp., 320 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. La. 1970) ($20,000).
144 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (a) (employment), 3610 (a) (housing) (1970).
145 Hackett v. McGuire Bros., Inc., 445 F.2d 442 (3rd Cir. 1971). See Marable v. Ala.
Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969) (three judge court).
146 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp.
56 (N.D. Tex. 1969); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D.
Ill. 1972).
147 Nyquist v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971), aff'g per curiam 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y.
1970).
148 In Moose Lodge, No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Supreme Court held
that a prospective black guest at an all-white private club lacked standing to challenge
the club's discriminatory membership policies, as distinguished from its practices vis-a-vis
non-white guests. Next term, the Court will review the decision in Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 332 F. Supp. 352 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 405 U.S. 915 (1972), in which lower federal courts held that incumbent tenants
lacked standing to complain of their landlord's alleged discriminatory policy vis-a-vis non-
white rental applicants. Plaintiffs claimed economic and emotional injury from the alleged
impairment of their opportunity for voluntary interracial association.
149 Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968); Hall v. Werthan
Bag Corp., 251 F. Supp. 184 '(M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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dividual civil rights litigant as that of a "private attorney general.' 150 Even
though the plaintiff may not be able to prove discrimination against him per-
sonally, he is entitled to a wide-ranging "pattern or practice" type of relief if
he can show that the defendant has engaged in discriminatory practices against
others.
151
The substantive relief available to plaintiffs alleging racial or related dis-
crimination is substantial. The basic remedy remains the injunction, but the
scope of injunctive relief accorded private litigants has been greatly expanded.
It used to be, for example, that a black pupil who sought a desegregated educa-
tion litigated only about his admission to a previously all-white school,'152 and
often he would lose. Today, however, a similar suit results not only in relief for
himself, but also in the desegregation of the faculty' 3 and total reorganization of
the entire school district,5 with neighboring school districts also possibly in-
cluded'5 5 In employment discrimination cases, a private plaintiff may also
cause the entire seniority system of a major industrial concern to be totally restruc-
tured.5" In fair housing suits, he may secure an order prohibiting the construc-
tion of any further public housing in an entire section of a major city.
5 7
Relief is now also readily available to the nonidealistic litigant who only
seeks compensation for the wrong inflicted upon him. While the public accom-
modations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly provides that an
injunction shall be the exclusive remedy for violations thereof,' the employment
title of the same Act provides for awards of injunctive relief, appropriate
affirmative action, and back pay.5 9 Back pay awards may be a very major ele-
ment of recovery, for the courts have made awards for reduced earnings over
extended periods of time at a substantial cost to the employer. 60
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 is the most explicit of all the civil rights
150 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
151 Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972).
152 Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
153 Bradley v. School Board, 382 U.S. 103 (1965).
154 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
155 See Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Bradley v. School Board
of City of Richmond, Va., 338 F. Supp. 67 *(E.D. Va. 1972), rev'd, No. 72-1058 (4th Cir.
June 7, 1972).
156 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
157 Banks v. Perk, 339 F. Supp. 1194 (N.D. Ohio 1972); cf. Gautreaux v. Chicago
Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 306 (7th Cir. 1970); Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th
Cir. 1971).
158 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-3(a), 2000a-6(b) (1970); United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
563 (1968); Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Since a violation of
the public accommodations statute will ordinarily be a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or §
1982, United States v. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969);
Scott v. Young, 307 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970), and because damages are available under these old laws, Sul-
livan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969), some financial recovery may be possible
for discriminatory denial of access to public accommodations.
159 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970). The provision for "affirmative action" may authorize
money damages if the wrong was intentional. See Garnean v. Raytheon Co., 341 F. Supp. 336
(D. Mass. 1972).
160 Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972). In this
case, the court awarded back pay under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for a period prior to the effective
date of Title VII, even though discrimination was not unlawful at the time it occurred, under
the law as then interpreted.
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statutes with respect to financial compensation for the victim. It provides for
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages up to $1,000.161
Compensatory damages are awarded for humiliation and emotional distress, as
well as for financial loss. A defendant who loses his case in court may be liable
for more money than he thinks he can afford. In Seaton v. Sky Realty, Inc.'62
the court awarded a husband and his spouse $500 for embarrassment and incon-
venience and $1,000 each against each of three defendants (a real estate com-
pany and two agents) in punitive damages. In Peoples v. Doughtie,'63 the court
awarded a black couple $750 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive
damages against an elderly lady who had excluded them from her three-unit
apartment house. Moreover, larger awards are in store, for discrimination in
housing violates 42 U.S.C. § 1982164 as well as the Fair Housing Act, and it
has been held that the $1,000 limitation on punitive damages has no application
under the old statute."5
A question remains as to whether, and to what extent, the United States
is authorized to secure compensation for individual victims of discrimination in
"pattern or practice" litigation. It is well settled that the Attorney General's
prime function is to vindicate the public interest and deal with cases having a
public, rather than a private, impact. 6 Several of the controlling statutes em-
phasize that the Attorney General is to sue for preventive relief.' 7 They go on
to say, however, that he should apply for whatever order he deems necessary to
assure the "full enjoyment" of any rights protected by the title.
It has long been settled that some relief for individual victims of discrimina-
tion is authorized. In State of Alabama v. United States,6' the court's equitable
power was held to permit the District Judge to require the registration of specific
Negroes who had been discriminatorily denied the right to vote. Courts have
ordered adjustments of pay rates for individual blacks in the Government's
employment cases.69 and offers to rent housing to unsuccessful black applicants
in housing cases.' These decisions disclose a recognition by courts of equity
that, at least to some degree, the Attorney General's "pattern or practice" au-
thority should be used to put identifiable individuals, as well as the classes suffer-
ing discrimination, in their "rightful place."'' But what about money?
The tradition has been negative. During the days of voting litigation, in
161 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c).
162 P-H 1972 E.O.H. REP. 13,530 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 1972).
163 P-H 1972 E.O.H. REP. 13,528 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 1971).
164 Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
165 Pierce v. Naughton, Civil No. 70-C-645 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 1, 1970); Young v. T. A. Real
Estate & Constr. Co., Civil No. 70-C-1935 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 1, 1970).
166 United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 483 (N.D. Ga. 1971); United States v.
Hunter, 459 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1972).
167 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971(c) (voting), 2000a-5(a) (public accommodations), 3613 (hous-
ing) (1970). The word "preventive" was, however, omitted from 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a)
(employment) (1970).
168 304 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.), aff'd, 371 U.S. 37 (1962).
169 E.g., United States v. Medical Soc'y of South Carolina, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C.
1969).
170 United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); see
United States v. Reddoch, Civil No. 6541-71 (S.D. Ala., Jan. 23, 1972) (offer of preferential
consideration).
171 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 1971).
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which blacks were so often wilfully disfranchised on account of race, the idea
of a financial remedy for them through suits by the Attorney General was never
litigated or, so far as the writer is aware, even discussed. The same holds true
for school desegregation cases. The Attorney General has, however, recently
asserted his authority to an injunction, including back pay for the victims in em-
ployment discrimination cases. The courts are, so far, divided as to whether
he has such authority." 2 The Attorney General has also negotiated a few consent
decrees in fair housing cases in which the payment of compensation to individual
victims is recited in the preamble as one of the elements of the bargain. 3- In
general, the victim of discrimination in employment or housing has better pros-
pects for compensation if he acts on his own behalf, through the administrative
or judicial process, but some recovery even from suits primarily geared to assert
the public interest is not foreclosed to him.'
VI. Conclusion
For the greater part of a century, the equal opportunity guarantees of the
post-war amendments were honored more in breach than in observance. Rather
than "warrants for the here and now," these rights were but "hopes to some
future enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional promise."'375
The machinery of federal enforcement initiated by the Civil Rights Act
of 1957 and expanded by later laws, and the resourcefulness of judges and
advocates in devising fair but effective remedies, have transformed the character
of the battle. He who discriminates, or capitalizes on the discrimination of an-
other, can no longer afford what was once quite justifiable confidence that
nothing would be done. The United States and its citizens now have available
the legal tools required to do racial justice. Whether this goal is reached in prac-
tice depends on the resources and commitment, both public and private, which
are invested in the task.
172 In United States v. Wood, Wire & Metal Lath., Intl. U., Loc. U. 46, 328 F. Supp.
429, 441 (S.D. N.Y. 1971), the court determined that back pay was a proper element of relief
in suits by the Attorney General. A number of consent decrees negotiated by the Attorney
General have also resulted in substantial back pay awards. See, e.g., United States v. House-
hold Finance Corp., Civil No. 72-0-515 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 29, 1972) (about $125,000 in back
pay to female employees).
173 E.g., United States v. Goldberg, Civil No. 70-1223 (S.D. Fla., Dec. 28, 1971); United
States v. Magnolia Manor, Civil No. 4681 (S.D. Miss., Jan. 27, 1971).
174 In United States v. Scott Management Co., Civil No. 21234 (D. Md., Mar. 24, 1971),
the consent decree ordered defendants to negotiate in good faith with individual complainants
under the aegis of the Secretary of HUD and to report to the court on any progress in the
negotiations.
175 Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963) (emphasis in original).
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